https://www.humantruth.info/russia_information_warfare.html
By Vexen Crabtree 2024
#democracy_challenges #disinformation #Elon_Musk #facebook #tiktok #twitter
Information warfare is an explicit part of Russian doctrine, deemed suitable for peace-time1,2. Aside from direct and easily recognizable propaganda found in Russia Today and Sputnik2, the internet has seen 'web brigades' of Russian-paid actors trawling for content on selected topics, who then make destructive, abusive, aggressive, untrue and confusing comments, for the purpose of spreading doubt and disrupting conversations. This occurs on news sites' comments sections and on social media, in particular, on poorly-moderated platforms such as TikTok, Twitter and Facebook. Twitter in particular has become a swamp of such lies and misinformation since Elon Musk dismissed its content moderation teams. They often spread popularist and divisive content and as such, tend to be reposted by far-right activists; Donald Trump himself sometimes shares misinformation invented by Russian troll accounts.
The actors are often paid per comment, and specifically, for the amount of replies they generate, which means they often say things that are untrue and contentious; the quantity of replies boost the trolls' comments to the top of the list below the article. Because it is paid, those who participate are from around the world, not just from inside Russia. One of the first well-known troll farms was the "Internet Research Agency" owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who also ran the mercenary Wagner Group for Russia. Another is Operation Doppleganger which saw two companies, Structura National Technology and Social Design Agency, produce a range of slick websites that mimicked other news sites, but with fake news3. Operation Overload seeks to overwhelm news and fact-checkers with false material4,5. There is almost no counter to these trolls; they successfully disrupt conversations especially when several of them act together against a particular outlet, and, concerted campaigns can, and have, increase instability in Western countries6 and influenced elections2,7.
Information warfare is an explicit part of Russian doctrine, meaning, it is not a secret1. Aleksandr Dugin's well-received 1997 book Foundations of Geopolitics was successful because his family is well-connected with Russian intelligence, and the message of Russia regaining power and influence by using disinformation to destabilize the west seemed both do-able and relatively easy.
In a public news article, Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Chief of the Armed Staff, calls it "information confrontation aimed at the reduction of the fight potential of the enemy"2. Russia's defense Minister, Sergey Shoygu, stated in 2015 that "words, [...] the Internet and information in general have become yet another type of weapon, yet another type of armed forces"2.
#disinformation #EU #Europe #informnation_warfare #NATO #Russia #ukraine
NATO has been warning for some time that Russia has been conducting long-term information warfare operations, on a scale and sophistication that dwarves anything that NATO or Europe is doing in response8. Russia has pumped funding into political parties within western countries that are divisive, that oppose the EU and western alliances, and that would destabilize their countries6,9. The build-up to the 2014 Russia's invasion of Crimea, the southern peninsula of Ukraine, saw the beginning of the current surge in Russian disinformation targeting Europe and the Americas since 20132.
The propaganda and disinformation campaigns aren't there just to 'convince' Westerners of Russia's point of view. The majority of it is designed to create doubt and mistrust between people in a country by increasing the volume of sectarian and disgruntled voices. The logic is: if people don't trust the news, or their government, then, they won't trust those sources when they report of Russia's actions on the edges of Europe.
“We [the West] see the public discourse as one where the facts and differing points of view are laid out for debate. However, the Kremlin is not necessarily trying to win the argument, but instrumentalising information in order to achieved a desired effect [... - ] to create doubt and confusion so that [international responses are] slow and hesitant.”
"NATO and the Power of Narrative" by Mark Laity (2015)10
“As was highlighted, if the Russians detect what they believe is a weakness on our part, they will play upon it. [...] The key thing that we have to do is find trusted intermediaries [to lever in order to improve our own information ops against Russia] when it comes to resourcing, in the military sense, there is a lot of issues. We don't train enough people, we don't keep them doing the job long enough, and we are still somewhat behind in integrating the information effort into everything we do.”
Mark Laity (2016)11
“Where an authentic grievance or setback is present, the Kremlin disinformation machinery tries to explore and exploit it. At the EU and NATO level, it tries to use pro-Kremlin attitudes of selected politicians to undermine collective efforts [and] the trust of citizens towards their governments, allied organisations and states, democratic political parties, mainstream media or state institutions (such as judiciary or police) in general. [...] The Kremlin uses this vehicle as part of its hybrid warfare to achieve its strategic objective to disrupt the internal cohesion of NATO, the EU and its willingness to react to aggressive policies of the Russian Federation.”
"Full-Scale Democratic Response to Hostile Disinformation Operations"
European Values (2016)2
The Operation Doppelganger and the similar Operation Overload4,5 are both Russian disinformation campaigns targeting western countries with huge quantities of semi-automated 'co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour' (i.e., social media manipulation), to give the false impression of large public backing for Russian positions. Doppelganger focused on creating fake news content:
“A Russian disinformation campaign has been found spreading fake articles posing as legitimate stories from major media outlets, such as The Washington Post and Fox News, in order to undermine the Western support for Ukraine amid the Russian-Ukraine War. This is according to Meta's latest threat report, which asserts that there are two companies behind this disinformation operation - Structura National Technology and Social Design Agency - that formerly targeted other countries, including Germany and France. Both companies previously have been sanctioned by the European Union after being caught by Meta.
Doppelganger, the name for the operation, has spoofed the domains for these notable news sites and spammed out the linked stories on social media platforms, some of the stories being particularly elaborate. The operation also uses the bylines of real journalists working for these media organizations.”
IT Security website Dark Reading (2023)3
Russian intelligence since the 2010s has put renewed efforts into identifying western political parties, politicians or extremist movements that would disrupt, divide and destabilize their countries and "using social media, disseminating propaganda, and sponsoring corrupt leaders and organisations"9. It funds them directly, or, indirectly if there are legal constraints. They also use large quantities of fake and bot social media accounts to boost the narratives of divisive movements, creating a fake sense of solidarity or popularity, and. boosts feelings of injustice, anger or distrust that those groups need in order to grow. Russian disinformation campaigns push fake news stories and fake outrage at immigration and other hot-topics, to the extent that general populations perceive much greater problems in their countries than there really are. Mostly, this means supporting right-wing, anti-EU and extremist politicians such as in the UK, France, Germany, but, in the occasional country such as Spain, it supports some far-left parties. The effect is to make governments inwards-looking and retract from the world, having to concentrate on domestic issues and damaging alliances and interest in the world.2,6,9,12,13,14
“We are faced with a crisis concerning the use of data, the manipulation of our data, and the targeting of pernicious views. In particular, we heard evidence of Russian state-sponsored attempts to influence elections in the US and the UK through social media [...].
160. Russia specifically [is] supporting organisations that create and disseminate disinformation, false and hyper-partisan content, with the purpose of undermining public confidence and of destabilising democratic states. This activity we are describing as 'disinformation' and it is an active threat.
161. The Committee heard evidence of a co-ordinated, long-standing campaign by the Russian Government to influence UK elections and referenda, and similar evidence of foreign interference is being investigated by the US Congress in respect of the 2016 US Presidential Election. Thanks to these hearings we know that, during the Presidential Election, the Russians ran over 3,000 adverts on Facebook and Instagram to promote 120 Facebook pages in a campaign that reached 126 million Americans. In further evidence from Facebook given to our Committee, we know that the Russians used sophisticated targeting techniques and created customized audiences to amplify extreme voices in the campaign, particular those on sensitive topics such as race relations and immigration.”
"Disinformation and 'Fake News': Interim Report"
UK Govt (2018)14
#france #germany #Russia #Spain
“We heard evidence that showed alleged Russian interference in the Spanish Referendum, in October 2017. During the Referendum campaign, Russia provoked conflict, through a mixture of misleading information and disinformation, between people within Spain, and between Spain and other member states in the EU, and in NATO. We heard evidence that showed that Russia had a special interest in discrediting the Spanish democratic system, through Russian state affiliated TV organisations spreading propaganda that benefitted those wanting independence in Catalonia.”
"Disinformation and 'Fake News': Interim Report"
UK Govt (2018)15
“Spain, in contrast to the media landscape in other EU countries previously assessed, represents a different focus for Russian propaganda efforts due to Moscow's long-standing connections and the support that the Kremlin has historically provided to local communist and far-left movements. These ties distinguish Spain from countries such as Germany and France, where the far-right actors and outlets typically support pro-Kremlin narratives.”
Espresso Global (2024)
#information_warfare #russia #ukraine
“The Kremlin's disinformation campaign during the seizure of Crimea is unique in recent history in that it was deliberately exposed as a lie by the Kremlin itself.
On March 4, 2014, President Vladimir Putin gave a press conference in which he insisted that the "only thing" Russia had done during the seizure of Crimean government buildings by unidentified gunmen was "to enhance the defence of our military facilities". When asked outright whether the forces involved were Russians, he insisted that "those were local self-defence units". But a year later, he openly, indeed proudly, announced in a documentary on the annexation that he had led it himself. [...]
Putin's willingness to expose his own dishonesty shows one of the key features of modern disinformation campaigns: they are not intended to last forever, but for long enough to achieve a specific effect. The effect of Putin´s lie was to help obscure the presence of regular Russian soldiers in Crimea for the critical period during which they prepared the pseudo-referendum on the annexation. Once that purpose was served, the lie could be abandoned.”
Once Crimea was taken (in 2014), Russia simply dropped the pretence that it wasn't working on the peninsula. The West appears to have suffered from mass amnesia when Russia repeated the exact same techniques in eastern Ukraine, denying its involvement. Russia-watchers sounded the alarms, but were not heeded:
“An aggressive disinformation effort by the Russian Federation and its allies has been very visible within EU member states since 2013 - the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis.”
"Full-Scale Democratic Response to Hostile Disinformation Operations"
European Values (2016)2
“Kremlin denials of their military presence on the peninsula were not aimed at making us believe they were not there, but, to create doubt and confusion so that the Ukrainian and international response was slow and hesitant. Having achieved its operational aim, the Kremlin casually admitted the lies. [...] Today, the Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine continues to be denied, though the evidence is overwhelming.”
"NATO and the Power of Narrative" by Mark Laity (2015)10
This campaign was successful - even with Russian troops massed on the border of Ukraine, the west was simply not prepared; the clear evidence had been drowned out by years of anti-Ukraine misinformation.